Speaker:
Sonal Yadav
- University of Padua
Wednesday, June 28, 2017
at
12:30 PM
Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Room 1.59
We study a matching model in which agents have to be matched in pairs to undertake a project. Each agent partitions the set of partners into friends and outsiders, and the set of of possible projects, into good and bad ones (dichotomous preferences). The overall preference ordering on partner, project pairs is separable. Friendship is mutual and preferences over projects among friends exhibit value homophily in the following sense: when comparing two friends, the set of good projects for one individual is included in the set of good projects of her friend. We propose appropriate notions of stability and non-manipulability in this model and provide an algorithm (PBCA) that generates stable allocations and satisfies a limited notion of Pareto efficiency called friendship efficiency but fails non-manipulability. Another algorithm, the fixed priority algorithm (FPA) also generates a robustly stable allocation and is non-manipulable but fails friendship efficiency. We conjecture an impossibility with respect to all the three properties: robust stability, friendship efficiency and non-manipulability. Finally we show stable allocations may not exist if the value homophily and dichotomous preferences assumptions are relaxed.
- Programme Director
-
Claudio
Zoli
-
External reference
-
- Publication date
-
March 10, 2017
pdf (it, 212 KB, 21/06/17)
