Pubblicazioni

Autori:

Angelo, Antoci; Paolo, Russu; Zarri, Luca

Titolo:

Tax Evasion in a Behaviorally Heterogeneous Society: An Evolutionary Analysis

Anno:

2014

Tipologia prodotto:

Articolo in Rivista

Tipologia ANVUR:

Articolo su rivista

Lingua:

Inglese

Formato:

A Stampa

Referee:

Sì

Nome rivista:

ECONOMIC MODELLING

ISSN Rivista:

0264-9993

N° Volume:

42

Intervallo pagine:

106-115

Parole chiave:

Behavioral Heterogeneity; Cheating; Evolutionary Game Theory; Peer Punishment; Public Goods Game; Tax Morale

Breve descrizione dei contenuti:

We focus on the tax evasion dynamics emerging from repeated interaction of three types of taxpayers: cheaters, honest citizens and punishers. By assuming that cultural evolution is driven by material payoffs only, we show that a long overlooked behavioral attitude towards taxation such as tax morale is important to dynamically induce higher levels of tax compliance within a large-scale population. The results of our evolutionary analysis reveal that the presence of taxpayers who both act honestly in the first place and are willing to costly sanction cheaters plays an important role for the long-run success of the social battle against tax evasion.

Id prodotto:

81839

Handle IRIS:

11562/741961

depositato il:

16 giugno 2014

ultima modifica:

16 ottobre 2024

Citazione bibliografica:

Angelo, Antoci; Paolo, Russu; Zarri, Luca, Tax Evasion in a Behaviorally Heterogeneous Society: An Evolutionary Analysis «ECONOMIC MODELLING» , vol. 42 , 2014 , pp. 106-115

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