Pubblicazioni

Autori:

Bracco, Emanuele; De Benedetto, Marco Alberto; Lisciandra, Maurizio

Titolo:

Manipulating municipal budgets: unveiling opportunistic behavior of Italian mayors

Anno:

2024

Tipologia prodotto:

Articolo in Rivista

Tipologia ANVUR:

Articolo su rivista

Lingua:

Inglese

Formato:

Elettronico

Referee:

Sì

Nome rivista:

PUBLIC CHOICE

ISSN Rivista:

0048-5829

N° Volume:

198

Editore:

Kluwer Academic Publishers:Journals Department, PO Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht Netherlands:011 31 78 6576050, EMAIL: frontoffice@wkap.nl, kluweronline@wkap.nl, INTERNET: http://www.kluwerlaw.com, Fax: 011 31 78 6576254

Intervallo pagine:

317-342

Parole chiave:

Local political budget cycle, Real estate tax, Waste disposal tariffs, Clientelism, Fiscal manipulation, Electoral incentives

Breve descrizione dei contenuti:

We examine the political budget cycle hypothesis using revenue data from Italian munici- pal administrations. By leveraging on the staggered schedule of local elections and employ- ing a difference-in-differences strategy, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by may- ors. In pre-election years, mayors reduce total accrued revenues from municipal solid waste fees and property taxes, which are the primary sources of revenue in municipal financial statements. Non-term-limited mayors who seek re-election engage in such opportunistic behavior, while those facing a binding term limit do not manipulate revenues for electoral purposes. Our findings remain robust across various specifications and controls. Heteroge- neity analysis suggests that the observed results are primarily driven by smaller municipali- ties, as well as by those situated in the South of Italy that exhibit low levels of social capi- tal. Mayors employing political budget cycles also strategically offset reductions in highly salient fees and taxes by raising less salient non-tax revenues. This study contributes to the understanding of political budget cycles in the context of Italian municipal administrations and has implications for the broader literature on electoral behavior and public finance.

Pagina Web:

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-023-01131-3

Id prodotto:

136609

Handle IRIS:

11562/1115626

ultima modifica:

30 novembre 2024

Citazione bibliografica:

Bracco, Emanuele; De Benedetto, Marco Alberto; Lisciandra, Maurizio, Manipulating municipal budgets: unveiling opportunistic behavior of Italian mayors «PUBLIC CHOICE» , vol. 198 , 2024 , pp. 317-342

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