Paolo Pin on The effect of externalities aggregation on network games outcomes

Speaker:  Paolo Pin - Università degli Studi di Siena
  Monday, November 10, 2014 at 12:30 PM Sala Seminari Palazzina DSE V.lo Campofiore 2

 We generalize results on the monotonicity of equilibria for network games with in- complete information. In those games players know the stochastic process of network formation and their own degree in the realized network, and decide an action depending on the strategic interaction in the network between their own action and a statistic (as the mean, the maximum or the minimum) of neighbors’ actions. We show that, even under degree independence, not only the distinction between strategic complements and strategic substitutes is important in determining the nature of Bayesian Nash equilibria, but also the nature itself of the statistic. 

Documents
Title Format  (Language, Size, Publication date)
paper  pdfpdf (it, 367 KB, 17/10/14)

Programme Director
Diego Lubian

External reference
Angelo Zago

Publication date
September 26, 2014

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