Paolo Pin on The effect of externalities aggregation on network games outcomes

Relatore:  Paolo Pin - Università degli Studi di Siena
  lunedì 10 novembre 2014 alle ore 12.30 Sala Seminari Palazzina DSE V.lo Campofiore 2

 We generalize results on the monotonicity of equilibria for network games with in- complete information. In those games players know the stochastic process of network formation and their own degree in the realized network, and decide an action depending on the strategic interaction in the network between their own action and a statistic (as the mean, the maximum or the minimum) of neighbors’ actions. We show that, even under degree independence, not only the distinction between strategic complements and strategic substitutes is important in determining the nature of Bayesian Nash equilibria, but also the nature itself of the statistic. 

Titolo Formato  (Lingua, Dimensione, Data pubblicazione)
paper  pdfpdf (it, 367 KB, 17/10/14)

Referente
Diego Lubian

Referente esterno
Angelo Zago

Data pubblicazione
26 settembre 2014

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