Abstract
I study the relationship between data and market power in a duopoly model of price discrimination with search frictions. One firm receives a signal about the valuation of any arriving consumer while its rival receives no information. A share of consumers, referred to as searchers, have equal valuation for the good of either firm and optimally choose which firms to visit. The remaining consumers are captive. In equilibrium, a large majority of searchers will only visit the firm with data. The market share of the firm with data converges to one as the share of searchers in the market goes to one, regardless of the signal structure. Reductions of search frictions exacerbate the dominant position of the firm with data. The establishment of a right to data portability can address the competitive imbalances caused by data advantages.
via Cantarane, 24
37129 Verona
VAT number01541040232
Italian Fiscal Code93009870234
© 2024 | Verona University
******** CSS e script comuni siti DOL - frase 9957 ********p>