Publications

Authors:

Angelo, Antoci; Paolo, Russu; Zarri, Luca

Title:

Tax Evasion in a Behaviorally Heterogeneous Society: An Evolutionary Analysis

Year:

2014

Type of item:

Articolo in Rivista

Tipologia ANVUR:

Articolo su rivista

Language:

Inglese

Format:

A Stampa

Referee:

Sì

Name of journal:

ECONOMIC MODELLING

ISSN of journal:

0264-9993

N° Volume:

42

Page numbers:

106-115

Keyword:

Behavioral Heterogeneity; Cheating; Evolutionary Game Theory; Peer Punishment; Public Goods Game; Tax Morale

Short description of contents:

We focus on the tax evasion dynamics emerging from repeated interaction of three types of taxpayers: cheaters, honest citizens and punishers. By assuming that cultural evolution is driven by material payoffs only, we show that a long overlooked behavioral attitude towards taxation such as tax morale is important to dynamically induce higher levels of tax compliance within a large-scale population. The results of our evolutionary analysis reveal that the presence of taxpayers who both act honestly in the first place and are willing to costly sanction cheaters plays an important role for the long-run success of the social battle against tax evasion.

Product ID:

81839

Handle IRIS:

11562/741961

Deposited On:

June 16, 2014

Last Modified:

October 16, 2024

Bibliographic citation:

Angelo, Antoci; Paolo, Russu; Zarri, Luca, Tax Evasion in a Behaviorally Heterogeneous Society: An Evolutionary Analysis «ECONOMIC MODELLING» , vol. 42 , 2014 , pp. 106-115

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