Relatore:
Andrea Matozzi
- Università di Bologna e EUI
mercoledì 23 marzo 2022
alle ore
12.00
In presenza + Zoom Webinar
We develop a model showing that when labor demand is inelastic and in-dividual behavior is easily monitored a firm’s employees may prefer to protectits shirkers. By optimally reducing overall effort and increasing wages for all,a labor association rationally use its monopoly power as described in the leftwing labor slogan “work less so that all may work.” In addition, employees havea strong incentive to conceal information about peers’ performance from firms,what has been infamously known as theblue wall of silencein the case of thepolice. We argue that a number of recently proposed remedies to this prob-lem are unlikely to succeed and suggest a more promising alternative: increasecompetition
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https://univr.zoom.us/j/81734790700
