Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and Trade, Emmanuelle Auriol (Toulouse School of Economics)

Speaker:  Emmanuelle Auriol - Toulouse School of Economics
  Wednesday, April 29, 2015 at 12:30 PM Aula Seminari, Vicolo Campofiore 2
The paper studies countries’ incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR). IPR enforcement is U-shaped in a country’s market size relative to the aggregated market size of its trade partners: small/poor countries protect IPR to get access to advanced economies’ markets, while large emerging countries tend to free-ride on rich countries’ technology to serve their internal demand. Asymmetric protection of IPR, strict in the North and lax in the South, leads in many cases to a higher level of innovation than universal enforcement. An empirical analysis conducted with panel data covering 112 countries and 45 years of world patents supports the theoretical predictions. 

Programme Director

External reference
Angelo Zago

Publication date
December 2, 2014