According to the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), voting yields “positive information aggregation” in a common interest situation: groups make better decisions than individuals could have made, provided that individuals are more likely to be right than wrong. However, if individuals are biased, i.e. if they tend to systematically choose the inferior option, the CJT predicts poorer outcomes for groups than for individuals. We show that information aggregation can cut either way. In particular, we find that groups do worse than individuals when individual voters are biased. In addition, we test how providing social information shapes voting outcomes in the presence of biases. In treatment
facts, voters learn thefacts are de-biasing and improve group performance as they alert voters toopinions, voters learn how popular theopinions
deteriorate group performance since biased voters find confirmation for their opinion and non-biased voters may yield to conformity. We find support for both hypotheses.
percentage of individuals who provided the correct answer in a previous session. We
hypothesize that
how common biases are in the electorate. In treatment
alternatives were among voters in a previous session. We hypothesize that
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