Relatore:
Gianni De Fraja
- Nottingham School of Economics and University of Rome "Tor Vergata"
mercoledì 16 maggio 2018
alle ore
12.30
Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona
In this paper we investigate the nature of the contracts between a large health-care purchaser and health service providers and the payment they receive for their treatments. We model theoretically the interaction between patient choice and cream-skimming by competing hospitals. We test the model using a very large and detailed administrative dataset. In line with our theoretical results, we show that in the Italian region of Lombardy, the state funded purchaser offers providers a system of incentives such that the most efficient providers both treat more patients, and also treat more difficult patients, thus receiving, a higher average payment per treatment.
- Referente
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Diego
Lubian
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Referente esterno
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- Data pubblicazione
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13 febbraio 2018