Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Italy

Relatore:  Gianni De Fraja - Nottingham School of Economics and University of Rome "Tor Vergata"
  mercoledì 16 maggio 2018 alle ore 12.30 - Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona
In this paper we investigate the nature of the contracts between a large health-care purchaser and health service providers and the payment they receive for their treatments. We model theoretically the interaction between patient choice and cream-skimming by competing hospitals. We test the model using a very large and detailed administrative dataset. In line with our theoretical results, we show that in the Italian region of Lombardy, the state funded purchaser offers providers a system of incentives such that the most efficient providers both treat more patients, and also treat more difficult patients, thus receiving, a higher average payment per treatment.

Diego Lubian

Data pubblicazione
13 febbraio 2018