Complementarity and Information in Collective Action

Relatore:  Stefano Barbieri - Tulane University
  mercoledì 4 luglio 2018 alle ore 12.30 - Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona
We study the effects on collective action problems of new technologies that make acquiring information easier, but also make it more likely that agents receive the same information. When information acquisition is easier, agent’s information becomes more “precise.” If agents are more likely to receive the same information, information becomes more “common.” We couch our analysis in a voluntary provision of public good framework, characterize symmetric equilibrium, and demonstrate the key role played by complementarity of individual inputs in the production function of the public good. If individual inputs are more (less) complementary than for the standard summation production function, then increasing precision decreases (increases) expected public good provision. At the same time though, increasing commonality increases (decreases) expected public good provision if the production technology if more (less) complementary than summation. Our model thus predicts a differential effect of new technologies on different kinds of collective action problems.​

Luca Zarri

Data pubblicazione
21 dicembre 2017