Applied industrial economics (2010/2011)

Codice insegnamento
4S02471
Docenti
Claudio Zoli, Emanuele Giovannetti, Angelo Zago
Coordinatore
Claudio Zoli
crediti
9
Settore disciplinare
SECS-P/02 - POLITICA ECONOMICA
Lingua di erogazione
Inglese
Periodo
Primo semestre dal 4-ott-2010 al 22-dic-2010.

Orario lezioni

Obiettivi formativi

The course focuses on relevant topics of modern industrial organizations, with a particular attention to the analysis of empirical applications.
Lectures are organized in three modules:
- Incentives: horizontal agreement and vertical relations (E. Giovannetti)
- Incentives and internal organization (A. Zago)
- Incentives, auctions and procurement (C. Zoli)
The aim of the course is to provide students with rigorous economic tools for the analysis of market structure and market relations and of the role played by incentives in shaping the internal organization of the firms and in designing the allocation mechanisms of goods and resources.

At completion of the course students should be able to:
- Understand the market characteristics most likely to facilitate tacit collusion and the incentives and modalities of vertical foreclosure.
- understand the firms’ problems, in particular their interactions with the owners, the management, the workforce, and the input providers.
- Analyse and assess auction/procurement mechanisms both from the point of view of the seller and the buyers.

Programma

The three modules will cover the following subjects:

Markets: horizontal and vertical relations (E. Giovannetti): Collusion, mergers, vertical restraints, advanced monopoly theory.

Incentives and internal organization (A. Zago): Principal and agent model, multitasks model, hierarchies.

Incentives, auctions and procurement (C. Zoli): introduction to auction theory, applications to auctions and procurement design.


Reading list:
Selected readings will be taken from the following texts

Campbell, D. E. (2006): Incentives: motivations and the economics of information. Cambridge University Press
Jehle, G. A. and Reny, P. J. (2001) Advanced Microeconomic Theory.. Addison Wesley
Klemperer, P. (2004): Auctions: theory and practice. Princeton University Press
Martin, S. (1993): Advanced Industrial Economics. Blackwell.
Milgrom P. (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge University Press.
Molho, I, (1997): The Economics of Information. Blackwell
Motta, M. (2004): Competition Policy. Cambridge University Press
Ricketts, M. (2002): The Economics of Business Enterprise. Edward Elgar Publishing
Wolfstetter, E. (2003): Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial organization, auctions and incentives. Cambridge University Press

A detailed program of the course, and teaching material, will be available during the semester on the e-learning web page of the course.

Modalità d'esame

Written exam and project work.

Statistiche per i requisiti di trasparenza (Attuazione Art. 2 del D.M. 31/10/2007, n. 544)

Statistiche esiti
Esiti Esami Esiti Percentuali Media voti Deviazione Standard
Positivi 52.94% 28 2
Respinti 5.88%
Assenti 29.41%
Ritirati 11.76%
Annullati --
Distribuzione degli esiti positivi
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 30 e Lode
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 44.4% 0.0%

Valori relativi all'AA 2010/2011 calcolati su un totale di 17 iscritti. I valori in percentuale sono arrotondati al numero intero più vicino.