Applied industrial economics (2010/2011)

Course code
Name of lecturers
Claudio Zoli, Emanuele Giovannetti, Angelo Zago
Claudio Zoli
Number of ECTS credits allocated
Academic sector
Language of instruction
First semester dal Oct 4, 2010 al Dec 22, 2010.

Lesson timetable

Learning outcomes

The course focuses on relevant topics of modern industrial organizations, with a particular attention to the analysis of empirical applications.
Lectures are organized in three modules:
- Incentives: horizontal agreement and vertical relations (E. Giovannetti)
- Incentives and internal organization (A. Zago)
- Incentives, auctions and procurement (C. Zoli)
The aim of the course is to provide students with rigorous economic tools for the analysis of market structure and market relations and of the role played by incentives in shaping the internal organization of the firms and in designing the allocation mechanisms of goods and resources.

At completion of the course students should be able to:
- Understand the market characteristics most likely to facilitate tacit collusion and the incentives and modalities of vertical foreclosure.
- understand the firms’ problems, in particular their interactions with the owners, the management, the workforce, and the input providers.
- Analyse and assess auction/procurement mechanisms both from the point of view of the seller and the buyers.


The three modules will cover the following subjects:

Markets: horizontal and vertical relations (E. Giovannetti): Collusion, mergers, vertical restraints, advanced monopoly theory.

Incentives and internal organization (A. Zago): Principal and agent model, multitasks model, hierarchies.

Incentives, auctions and procurement (C. Zoli): introduction to auction theory, applications to auctions and procurement design.

Reading list:
Selected readings will be taken from the following texts

Campbell, D. E. (2006): Incentives: motivations and the economics of information. Cambridge University Press
Jehle, G. A. and Reny, P. J. (2001) Advanced Microeconomic Theory.. Addison Wesley
Klemperer, P. (2004): Auctions: theory and practice. Princeton University Press
Martin, S. (1993): Advanced Industrial Economics. Blackwell.
Milgrom P. (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge University Press.
Molho, I, (1997): The Economics of Information. Blackwell
Motta, M. (2004): Competition Policy. Cambridge University Press
Ricketts, M. (2002): The Economics of Business Enterprise. Edward Elgar Publishing
Wolfstetter, E. (2003): Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial organization, auctions and incentives. Cambridge University Press

A detailed program of the course, and teaching material, will be available during the semester on the e-learning web page of the course.

Assessment methods and criteria

Written exam and project work.

Statistics about transparency requirements (Attuazione Art. 2 del D.M. 31/10/2007, n. 544)

Outcomes Exams Outcomes Percentages Average Standard Deviation
Positive 52.94% 28 2
Rejected 5.88%
Absent 29.41%
Ritirati 11.76%
Canceled --
Distribuzione degli esiti positivi
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 30 e Lode
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 44.4% 0.0%

Data from AA 2010/2011 based on 17 students. I valori in percentuale sono arrotondati al numero intero più vicino.