Seminari - Dipartimento Scienze Economiche validi dal 17.06.2026 al 17.06.2027. https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=it https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=it&id=7042 Relatore: Lenka Slegerova; Provenienza: University of Verona; Data inizio: 2026-06-17; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Chiara Costi; Riassunto: This study estimates the causal effects of prenatal exposure to air pollution on newborn health using population-wide administrative data from Czechia covering more than 3 million births between 1994 and 2024, linked to daily measures of multiple air pollutants across the country. While a large literature documents associations between air pollution and adverse birth outcomes, establishing credible causal effects remains challenging due to residential sorting, confounding maternal characteristics, and high collinearity across pollutants. To address these challenges, we employ a sibling fixed-effects design that compares siblings born to the same mother under different levels of prenatal pollution exposure, thereby accounting for unobserved time-invariant maternal characteristics. Our preliminary results indicate that prenatal exposure to higher levels of air pollution reduces birth weight. We find negative effects across several pollutant categories, including gaseous pollutants, particulate matter, and heavy metals. Exposure to elevated pollution levels also increases the probability of low birth weight (below 2500 g), which affects more than 5% of newborns in the sample. The strongest effects are observed for heavy metals such as nickel and lead. Additional analyses are ongoing and include alternative newborn health outcomes based on Apgar scores as well as instrumental-variable approaches exploiting exogenous variation in meteorological conditions, including wind speed, wind direction, precipitation, and surface pressure. . Wed, 17 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=it&id=7042 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=it&id=6876 Relatore: Deniz Erdemlioglu; Provenienza: IÉSEG School of Management; Data inizio: 2026-06-23; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Cecilia Mancini; Riassunto: We develop a test to measure multi-asset (systemic) tail risk in the cross-section of asset returns. Using high-frequency data on individual U.S. stocks and sector-specific ETF portfolios, we estimate time-varying jump intensities and test for multi-asset tail risk around Fed policy announcements. The magnitude of the tail risk induced by Fed policy announcements varies over the business cycle, peaks during the global financial crisis, and remains high during phases of unconventional monetary policy. While most FOMC announcements generate systemic left-tail risk, there is no evidence that macro announcements have a similar effect. We construct a Fed-driven systemic tail risk (STR) indicator that helps explain the pre-FOMC announcement drift and significantly explains variance risk premia, particularly for the meetings without press conferences. Our measure complements existing option-based tail risk measures in identifying tail events. . Tue, 23 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=it&id=6876 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=it&id=7026 Relatore: Alejandro Medina; Provenienza: University of Verona; Data inizio: 2026-06-24; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Riassunto: Structural remedies, primarily divestitures, are the standard tool used by antitrust authorities in merger control to preserve competition ex-ante. Anticompetitive conduct, in contrast, is prosecuted ex-post: in the United States by the Department of Justice and state attorneys general under the Sherman Act, separately from the Federal Trade Commission#39;s merger review under the Clayton Act. These two enforcement tracks operate under distinct statutes and are not jointly designed. This paper exploits a natural overlap between them. In 2016, the FTC required Teva to divest 79 generic-drug products as a condition for its acquisition of Allergan Generics. A subset of these molecules had been the object of a coordinated price-fixing scheme between 2013 and 2015. Using monthly product-level data and a triple-differences design that compares cartelized-and-divested products to cartelized-only and non-cartelized counterparts, I estimate that the FTC divestiture lowered prices by approximately 44% relative to cartelized products that were not divested. By contrast, the cartel premium persisted at about +28% in cartelized molecules where no divestiture displaced an incumbent, suggesting that prosecution alone did not restore competitive pricing. Three complementary counterfactuals (overcharge-based, elasticity-based, and a structural Bertrand-Nash simulation) estimate consumer harm at $14-22 million in Propranolol HCL alone, and indicate that an anticipated divestiture would have prevented most of it. The results suggest that structural remedies and antitrust prosecution operate as complements, not substitutes, in restoring competitive pricing in previously cartelized markets, and that further interaction between these two entities should be enforced to prevent illegal market behavior. Wed, 24 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=it&id=7026