Seminari - Dipartimento Economics Seminari - Dipartimento Economics validi dal 02.10.2025 al 02.10.2026. https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0 The Color of Knowledge: Impacts of Tutor Race on Learning and Performance https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6688 Relatore: Vojtech Bartoš; Provenienza: Università degli Studi di Milano Statale; Data inizio: 2025-10-02; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Simone Quercia; Riassunto: We demonstrate that racial biases against tutors hinder learning. In e-learning experiments, U.S. conservatives are more likely to disregard advice from Black tutors, resulting in reduced performance compared to learners taught by white tutors. We show that the bias is unconscious and, consequently, does not skew tutor selection. In line with our theory, the bias disappears when the stakes are high. In contrast, liberals favor Black tutors without experiencing learning disparities. Methodologically, we contribute by using video post-production techniques to manipulate tutor race without introducing typical confounds. Additionally, we develop a novel two-stage design that simultaneously measures tutor selection, learning, and productivity. This is a joint work with Ulrich Glogowsky and Johannes Rincke. Thu, 2 Oct 2025 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6688 Two Inefficiencies of Self-Selection: Evidence from Health Care https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6689 Relatore: Toshiaki Iizuka; Provenienza: University of Tokyo; Data inizio: 2025-10-09; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Paola Bertoli; Riassunto: Self-selection into social programs can lead to socially excessive or insufficient participation. We propose a framework to detect and address these inefficiencies, applying it to diabetes care, where individuals above a biomarker threshold receive nudges to seek care. Crossing the threshold increases healthcare utilization and improves health outcomes. However, those who opt into caremdash;both compliers and beyond-compliersmdash;are generally healthier and benefit less, indicating reverse selection on gains. Targeting based on observable characteristics reduces excessive participation and improves welfare, while outreach to individuals reluctant to seek care despite high potential benefits mitigates insufficient participation and may further raise welfare. . Thu, 9 Oct 2025 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6689 Brown Bag Seminar: Pricing ultra-short-term volatility surfaces https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6719 Relatore: Guido Gazzani; Provenienza: Uinversity of Verona; Data inizio: 2025-10-21; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Andrea Mazzon; Riassunto: Options with maturities below one week, hereafter ultra-short-term options, have seen a sharp increase in trading activity in recent years. Yet, these instruments are difficult to price jointly using classical pricing models due to the pronounced oscillations observed in the at-the-money implied-volatility term structure across ultra-short-term tenors. We propose Edgeworth++, a parsimonious jumpndash;diffusion model featuring a nonparametric stochastic volatility component, which provides flexibility in capturing implied-volatility smiles for each tenor, combined with a deterministic shift extension, which allows the model to fit rich at-the-money implied-volatility shapes across tenors. A local (in tenor) expansion of the process characteristic function suited to price ultra-short tenor options is derived and pricing is conducted in closed form. We discuss the benefits of the proposed approach relative to benchmarks. Tue, 21 Oct 2025 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6719 Peter Bank (Technische Universität Berlin) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6679 Relatore: Peter Bank; Provenienza: Technische Universität Berlin; Data inizio: 2025-10-23; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Sara Svaluto Ferro. Thu, 23 Oct 2025 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6679 Brown Bag Seminar: GP incentives for diabetes prevention and management in Italy https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6721 Relatore: Luigi Boggian; Provenienza: University of Verona; Data inizio: 2025-10-28; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Andrea Mazzon; Riassunto: This study evaluates the impact of a disease management plan (DMP) incentive program targeting cardiovascular risk factorsmdash;specifically diabetesmdash;implemented across three Local Health Units (LHUs) in Italy. The analysis follows roughly 200 general practitioners for a period of 9 years, with the cohorts of observation defined at the doctor times; patient birth year times; year level. We begin with an event-study design, adjusting for pre-trends, to capture the dynamic effects of the programrsquo;s introduction in 2014. Identification is further strengthened by exploiting the age eligibility thresholdmdash;patients aged 65 and abovemdash;within a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) framework centered on the introduction of incentives. Our early results focus on three main outcomes: (i) the percentage of patients diagnosed with diabetes within each GPndash;birth cohortndash;year cell, (ii) the number of per-patient antidiabetic prescriptions across cohorts, and (iii) the number of per-patient glycated hemoglobin (HbA1c) screenings. The event-study analysis shows weakly positive effects of the incentive program on all three outcomes; however, pre-trends are likely to bias these estimates, which we address by adjusting for pre-trend residuals. However, our RDD analysis comparing the pre- and post-treatment periods (difference-in-discontinuities) finds no significant effect of the program on any of the outcomes, and no significant change in the RDD coefficients before and after the 2014 introduction of the incentives. Tue, 28 Oct 2025 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6721 Alessandro Palma (Tor Vergata) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6690 Relatore: Alessandro Palma; Provenienza: Tor Vergata; Data inizio: 2025-10-30; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Paola Bertoli. Thu, 30 Oct 2025 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6690 Brown Bag Seminar: Feather-Handed Fascists: Surveillance as a Signal of Bureaucratic Loyalty https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6722 Relatore: Andrea; Provenienza: Xamo; Data inizio: 2025-11-04; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Andrea Mazzon; Riassunto: How do bureaucrats#39; incentives shape surveillance in autocratic regimes? Most explanations relate bureaucratic output to ideological alignment or expertise. This paper shows that it can be mainly driven by bureaucrats who need to signal their loyalty to the regime. We compile a provincendash;year dataset for Fascist Italy (1922ndash;40) that links originally digitised biographies and appointments of all 415 provincial prefects to the universe of about 100,000 state surveillance dossiers, and we focus on the ones that voluntarily joined the Fascist Party, particularly before it seized power. We then estimate a Difference-in-Differences design exploiting prefect mobility. Prefects with this credible loyalty marker opened about 20 per cent fewer dossiers than career-appointed counterparts. After testing multiple alternative explanations, including competence and preferential deployment, we highlight that credible loyalists achieved comparable job security with lower surveillance and focused less on ``usual suspectsquot;, relative to career-appointed colleagues. The pattern fits loyalty-signalling motives: careerists, starting from lower loyalty priors, have to work harder to secure their positions. These findings provide rare systematic evidence on authoritarian surveillance and show how career concerns, rather than ideology or competence alone, can be powerful drivers of coercive behaviour. Tue, 4 Nov 2025 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6722 Agne Kajackaite (Università degli Studi di Milano Statale) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6699 Relatore: Agne Kajackaite; Provenienza: Università degli Studi di Milano Statale; Data inizio: 2025-11-06; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Marco Piovesan. Thu, 6 Nov 2025 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6699 Federico Boffa (Università di Bolzano) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6680 Relatore: Federico Boffa; Provenienza: Università di Bolzano; Data inizio: 2025-11-18; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona. Tue, 18 Nov 2025 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6680 Rita Santos (University of York) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6681 Relatore: Rita Santos; Provenienza: University of York; Data inizio: 2025-11-27; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Paola Bertoli. Thu, 27 Nov 2025 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6681 Nicola Lacetera (Università di Bologna) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6682 Relatore: Nicola Lacetera; Provenienza: Università di Bologna; Data inizio: 2025-12-04; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Università di Bologna; Referente interno: Simone Quercia. Thu, 4 Dec 2025 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6682 Maria Bigoni (Università di Bologna) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6701 Relatore: Maria Bigoni; Provenienza: Università di Bologna; Data inizio: 2026-01-22; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Simone Quercia. Thu, 22 Jan 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6701 Francesca Biagini (Ludwig Maximilians Universität Munich) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6683 Relatore: Francesca Biagini; Provenienza: Ludwig Maximilians Universität Munich; Data inizio: 2026-01-29; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Alessandro Gnoatto. Thu, 29 Jan 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6683 Paolo Li Donni (Universita' degli Studi di Palermo) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6691 Relatore: Paolo Li Donni; Provenienza: Universita' degli Studi di Palermo; Data inizio: 2026-02-05; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Paolo Pertile. Thu, 5 Feb 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6691 Angelique Acquatella (Toulouse School of Economics) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6684 Relatore: Angelique Acquatella; Provenienza: Toulouse School of Economics; Data inizio: 2026-02-26; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Giovanni Righetti. Thu, 26 Feb 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6684 Ester Mariucci (Université Paris-Saclay) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6685 Relatore: Ester Mariucci; Provenienza: Université Paris-Saclay; Data inizio: 2026-03-05; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Cecilia Mancini. Thu, 5 Mar 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6685 Fabio Galeotti (National Center for Scientific Research) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6704 Relatore: Fabio Galeotti; Provenienza: National Center for Scientific Research; Data inizio: 2026-04-02; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Simone Quercia. Thu, 2 Apr 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6704 Ivan Soraperra (Max Planck Institute for Human Development Berlin) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6686 Relatore: Ivan Soraperra; Provenienza: Max Planck Institute for Human Development Berlin; Data inizio: 2026-04-23; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Maria Vittoria Levati. Thu, 23 Apr 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6686 Martin Larsson (Carnegie Mellon University Chicago) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6687 Relatore: Martin Larsson; Provenienza: Carnegie Mellon University Chicago; Data inizio: 2026-04-30; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Sara Svaluto Ferro. Thu, 30 Apr 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6687 Matteo Ploner (Università di Trento) https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6706 Relatore: Matteo Ploner; Provenienza: Università di Trento; Data inizio: 2026-05-07; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Maria Vittoria Levati. Thu, 7 May 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=6706