Seminari - Dipartimento Scienze Economiche validi dal 09.06.2026 al 09.06.2027. https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0 https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0&id=6885 Relatore: Giulia Montresor; Provenienza: University of Verona; Data inizio: 2026-06-09; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Riassunto: This paper investigates the impact of teleworkability on commuting accidents byexploiting the large-scale shift toward remote work induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. Using administrative accident records from Spain (2016ndash;2023) and implementing difference-in-differences and event study designs, we find that teleworkable occupations decreased commuting accident rates by 27% per quarter relative to non-teleworkable ones. This reduction is particularly pronounced among female and younger workers. We further find that teleworkability primarily lowers non-fatal injuries, with significant declines across superficial, moderate, and severe injury categories. In addition, the reduction in accidents is amplified during periods of extremely cold weather. These safety gains persist beyond the immediate pandemic shock and reflect a genuine reduction in road risk rather than a reallocation of accidents to the home or physical workplace. Tue, 9 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0&id=6885 https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0&id=6886 Relatore: Maria Chaykina; Provenienza: University of Verona; Data inizio: 2026-06-16; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Riassunto: Many distributive decisions occur in dynamic settings, where payments are applied repeatedly, and individuals differ in how long they remain eligible. Examples include deferred compensation, pension accrual, bonus schemes, and insurance contracts. A distinctive feature of such settings is that two individuals can be treated identically in each period yet accumulate unequal total earnings because of different participation horizons. This generates a normative tension absent in one-shot redistribution problems. In this project, we ask: which principle constitutes a fair payment rule in such dynamic contexts? Are standard fairness ideals based on static environments predictive of intertemporal allocation decisions? We develop an incentivised laboratory experiment measuring distributive choices when inequality arises along two dimensions: contribution and participation time. The design isolates whether individuals treat each dimension as normatively relevant and quantifies the corresponding fairness views. Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0&id=6886 https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0&id=7042 Relatore: Lenka Slegerova; Provenienza: University of Verona; Data inizio: 2026-06-17; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Chiara Costi. Wed, 17 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0&id=7042 https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0&id=6876 Relatore: Deniz Erdemlioglu; Provenienza: IÉSEG School of Management; Data inizio: 2026-06-23; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Cecilia Mancini. Tue, 23 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0&id=6876 https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0&id=7026 Relatore: Alejandro Medina; Provenienza: University of Verona; Data inizio: 2026-06-24; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona. Wed, 24 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/main?ent=seminario&rss=0&id=7026