



## Program

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09.25—09.30 **Welcome**

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### Session 1 – Social networks and trust

Chair: Maria Vittoria Levati

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09.30—10.00 *The effect of social networks on trust*  
**Anna Conte**, Sapienza University of Rome

10.00—10.30 *Believe it or not: Experimental evidence on sunspot equilibria with social networks*  
**Pietro Battiston**, University of Parma

10.30—11.00 *A “Trojan Horse” in the peer-reviewed economic journals. How is trustworthiness the editorial process in the fee-charging journals?*  
**Andrea Morone**, University of Bari

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11.00—11.30 **Coffee break**

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### Session 2 – Social preferences and political economy

Chair: Chiara Nardi

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11.30—11.45 *Dictator game giving: Evidence from primary school students in El Salvador*  
**Arianna Galliera**, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart

11.45—12.00 *Pretending to be altruist*  
**Daniela Grieco**, University of Milan

12.00—12.30 *Conceding when not having to fear conflict: An impunity experiment*  
**Maria Cristina Scarafile**, University of Rome Tor Vergata

12:30—12:45 *Vote buying, redistribution and trust: Evidence from a lab experiment*  
**Alice Guerra**, University of Bologna

12.45—13.00 *Democracy in organizations*  
**José J. Domínguez**, University of Bologna

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13.00—14.00 **Lunch**

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### Session 3 – Labor economics and risk preferences

Chair: Simone Quercia

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- 14.00—14.30 *Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay, multitasking, and sorting in mission-oriented jobs*  
**Mirco Tonin**, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano
- 14.30—14.45 *Narrow bracketing of effort choices*  
**Francesco Fallucchi**, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research
- 14.45—15.15 *Slicing pies: Is risk aversion sensitive to verbal and pictorial framings of elicitation context?*  
**Luca Congiu**, University of Insubria
- 15.15—15.45 *Refugee migration, cognitive bias and cumulative prospect theory*  
**Majlinda Joxhe**, University of Luxembourg
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15.45—16.15 **Coffee break**

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### Session 4 – Field and natural experiments

Chair: Luca Zarri

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- 16.15—16.45 *Three doors anomaly, should I stay or should I go: An artefactual field experiment*  
**Alessandro Cascavilla**, University of Bari
- 16.45—17.00 *Perception of financial literacy*  
**Alessia Sconti**, University of Verona
- 17.00—17.30 *Play it again! A natural experiment on definitivity avoidance*  
**Filippo Pavesi**, LIUC University
- 17:30—18.00 *Information provision and consumer behaviour: Does CO2 emission awareness make us more climate friendly?*  
**Alice Pizzo**, University of Copenhagen
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**Abstracts**  
**(available only for long presentations)**

**Title:** *The effect of social networks on trust*

**Presenter:** Anna Conte

**Abstract:** Our social lives are governed by trust. But how do we choose whom to trust? In this work, based on a laboratory experiment, we explore whether building relationships in a social network increases individuals' level of trust. We find that social interactions direct trust, but their impulse is not sufficiently strong to result beneficial.

**Title:** *Believe it or Not: Experimental evidence on sunspot equilibria with social networks*

**Presenter:** Pietro Battiston

**Abstract:** Models with sunspot equilibria have long been a topic of interest among economists. It then becomes an interesting question to ask whether there is empirical support for their existence. One approach to answer this question is through lab experiments. Such equilibria have been successfully reproduced in the lab, but little is known about their determinants and, most importantly, about their convergence dynamics: when, and how, do individuals assign a coordination role to signals which are publicly known to have no fundamental value? In order to answer this question, we run a laboratory experiment in which individuals are connected through a network, and each of them directly observes the actions of her neighbors as well as aggregated information. By manipulating both the type of information available and the structure of the network, we study the extent to which players are able to converge, and how convergence happens over time. We show that general information about other players' behavior hinders coordination, while information specifically related to the sunspot enhances it.

**Title:** *A "Trojan Horse" in the peer-reviewed economic journals. How is trustworthiness the editorial process in fee-charging journals?*

**Presenter:** Andrea Morone

**Abstract:** This paper aims to unmask the inadequate quality standards applied by editors of a sample of fee-charging journals in economics. We submitted a bait-manuscript to 104 academic economic journals to test whether there is a difference in the peer-review process between Article Processing Charges (APC)-charging journals and Traditional journals which do not require a publication fee. The submitted bait-article, was based on completely made up data, with evident errors in terms of methodology, literature, reporting of results and quality of language. Nevertheless, about half (40% in Sample 1 and 66.7% in Sample 2) of the APC journals fell in the trap. Their editors accepted the article in the journals and required to pay the publication fee. We conclude that the Traditional model has a more effective incentive-mechanism in selecting articles, based on quality standards. Accordingly, articles published on APC-charging journals cannot be indexed mechanically in scientific database indexes (e.g., Scopus, ISI Web of Science) as well as considered for bibliometric evaluations of research institutions or scholars' productivity.

**Title:** *Conceding when not having to fear conflict: An impunity experiment*

**Presenter:** Maria Cristina Scarafile

**Abstract:** We run an Impunity experiment in which each participant decides for both roles, proposer and responder, how to share a monetary pie via stating for either role two demands. Since second demands may not exceed first demands, one can either maintain first demands or concede. Opportunistic proposers should demand the whole pie without conceding much. Responders also state maximal first demands but concede via second demands acceptance of all residuals (pie minus second proposer demand) exceeding their positive

disagreement payoff. We observe generally “little or no conceding”. The weaker mode of bimodal proposer behavior “maximal first demands” is dominated by modal “moderate demands” aiming at equal pie sharing. “Moderate demands” also dominate in response behavior. To assess how impunity questions findings participants confront after impunity the ultimatum and then the demand game, both allowing for conceding. Information feedback is only provided after all three games have been played.

**Title:** *Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay, multitasking, and sorting in mission-oriented jobs*

**Presenter:** Mirco Tonin

**Abstract:** How does pay-for-performance (P4P) impact productivity and the composition of workers in mission-oriented jobs when output has multiple dimensions? This is a central issue in the public sector, particularly in areas like education or healthcare. We conduct a laboratory experiment, manipulating compensation and mission, to answer these questions. For workers in non-mission-oriented treatments, we find that P4P has positive effects on productivity on the incentivized dimension of effort and negative effects on the non-incentivized dimension. In mission-oriented treatments, P4P generates instead minimal change on either dimension. Participants in the non-mission sector – but not in the mission-oriented one – sort on ability, with lower ability workers opting out of the P4P scheme. Thus, we find that the impact of P4P is substantially different for mission-oriented jobs.

**Title:** *Slicing pies: Is risk aversion sensitive to verbal and pictorial framings of elicitation context?*

**Presenter:** Luca Congiu

**Abstract:** Risk information may be expressed in various formats, both verbally and pictorially. Verbally, one may adopt ratio (1/10), percentage (10%) or probability (0.1) formats; pictorially, one may represent risk through pie charts, bars, stick figures. There is a growing evidence supporting the idea that different formats may lead to a different perception of risk, even though the conveyed information is essentially the same. The present experiment purports to test whether risk aversion is sensitive to verbal and pictorial framings of elicitation context. Ninety-five undergraduate and master students were confronted with an elicitation task à la Holt and Laury (2002), based on a menu of two-outcome lottery pairs. The verbal framing concerned the presentation of probabilities either as percentages (e.g., “10%”) or as ratios expressed in words (e.g., “1 out of 10”). The pictorial framing was applied at the pie chart used to represent such probabilities. In one version, it was employed a standard pie chart of two slices, whose areas were proportional to the probabilities they represented. In the alternative version, the standard pie was ‘sliced’ into ten equal slices, thereby mirroring the verbal framing. Results show that the pictorial framing decreased the elicited risk aversion by about 10 percent. This result is almost significant ( $p < 0.1$ ), but only when controlling for the salience of pie, relevance of slices, and the subject's age and nationality. The verbal framing produced no significant effects.

**Title:** *Refugee migration, cognitive bias and cumulative prospect theory*

**Presenter:** Majlinda Joxhe

**Abstract:** We study refugees’ choices in the presence of risk in an experimental setting and model implications for policy impacts. Employing an experimental protocol we simultaneously test for refugees’ risk preferences in two different theoretical settings. As a result, Cumulative Prospect Theory is found to provide a better fit for refugees’ risk decisions than Expected Utility. In order to determine the policy relevance of this result, we develop, simulate and compare two migration models based on these theories. We find that the expected net value of migration differs according to the nature of the model. The Cumulative Prospect Theory model is generally more sensitive to policy changes. Furthermore, there is evidence of self-selection of refugees, based on their risk profile, as a reaction to migration policies.

**Title:** *Three doors anomaly, should I stay or should I go: An artefactual field experiment*

**Presenter:** Alessandro Cascavilla

**Abstract:** This work aims to identify and quantify the biases behind the anomalous behavior of people when they deal with the Three Doors dilemma, which is a really simple but counterintuitive game. Carrying out an artefactual field experiment and proposing eight different treatments to isolate the anomalies, we provide new interesting experimental evidence on the reasons why subjects do not make the optimal decision. According to the experimental results, we are able to quantify the size and the impact of three main biases that explain the anomalous behavior of participants: Bayesian updating, illusion of control and status quo bias.

**Title:** *Play it again! A natural experiment on definitivity avoidance*

**Presenter:** Filippo Pavesi

**Abstract:** Behavioral biases affect a large number of human decisions, many of which have relevant welfare effects. We identify a bias that we denote as "Definitivity Avoidance" and explore how the introduction of explicit exposure mechanisms can contribute to attenuate it. Our identification strategy exploits a unique natural experiment - the introduction of a decision review system represented by technology-assisted player challenges in professional tennis - that allows us to isolate the bias. We show that in the presence of a bias the challenge rule reduces the number of calls that postpone the assignment of a point. Our findings may have significant policy implications providing a conceptual framework for the design of institutions to alleviate the welfare costs associated with definitivity avoidance in different contexts, such as court rulings, debt roll-over decisions and inefficient asset allocations.

**Title:** *Information provision and consumer behaviour: Does CO2 emission awareness make us more climate friendly?*

**Presenter:** Alice Pizzo

**Abstract:** To answer our research question we analyze the effect of information on personal carbon footprint linked to food consumption in a controlled field experiment (Harrison & List, 2004). The advantage of this particular study design is that we investigate ordinary people's food purchases from natural occurring environments, while still keeping clear cause-effect of the CO2 information. If we receive evidence of the expected results, we can thus provide unambiguous recommendations on how to provide consumers with information on greenhouse gas emissions from food going forward. Concretely, we asked a randomly selected sample of people to participate in the experiment in collaboration with Statistics Denmark. Participants have been randomized into three treatment groups which correspond to the download and use of one out of two apps (or both) that have been developed to easily and electronically collect participants food consumption data, while also being able to provide information of different nature.