Seminari - Dipartimento Economics validi dal 17.01.2020 al 17.01.2021. http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4941 Relatore: Cosimo Petracchi; Provenienza: Brown University; Data inizio: 2020-01-21; Ora inizio: 12.00; Referente interno: Simone Quercia. Tue, 21 Jan 2020 12:00:00 +0100 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4941 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4981 Relatore: Enriqueta Aragones; Provenienza: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; Data inizio: 2020-01-22; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Elena Manzoni; Riassunto: This paper studies the stability of a multi-level government. We analyze an extensive form game played between two politicians leading two levels of government. We characterize the conditions that render such government structures stable. We show that if leaders care about electoral rents and the preferences of the constituencies at different levels are misaligned, then the decentralized government structure may be unsustainable. This result is puzzling because, from a normative perspective, the optimality of decentralized decisions via a multi-level government structure is relevant precisely when different territorial constituencies exhibit preference heterogeneity. The application to the current conflict between Catalonia and Spain is specially relevant. Wed, 22 Jan 2020 12:00:00 +0100 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4981 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5032 Relatore: Ravi Pendakur; Provenienza: University of Ottawa; Data inizio: 2020-01-29; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Martina Menon; Riassunto: In Canada, modern agreements allow Indigenous groups to govern their internal affairs and assume greater responsibility and control over the decision-making that affects their communities. We use difference in difference models to measure the impact at the community level of the attainment of 7 types of modern agreements on average income and income inequality. Like earlier work based on older data, we find that Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements (CLCAs), which transfer land and money to Indigenous communities, raise average incomes a lot. In contrast, self-government and opt-in agreements, which allow Indigenous communities to take local control of land or fiscal issues, are associated with small losses in average income. Unlike earlier work, we also assess how modern agreements affect income inequality in Indigenous communities. We find that communities that attain a Self-Government Agreement or an opt-in arrangement related to land management see a decrease in the Gini coefficient for income inequality of roughly 2 to 3 percentage points. Attainment of modern agreements also affects inter-group inequality. In particular, Opt-in arrangements are correlated with larger income gaps between Indigenous and non-Indigenous households, even as they reduce overall income inequality in a community. Wed, 29 Jan 2020 12:00:00 +0100 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5032 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4963 Relatore: Fabrizio Iacone; Provenienza: University of Milan; Data inizio: 2020-02-05; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Francesca Rossi. Wed, 5 Feb 2020 12:00:00 +0100 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4963 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4980 Relatore: Federico Boffa; Provenienza: University of Bolzano; Data inizio: 2020-02-12; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Emanuele Bracco. Wed, 12 Feb 2020 12:00:00 +0100 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4980 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5035 Relatore: Olof Johansson Stenman; Provenienza: University of Gothenburg; Data inizio: 2020-03-11; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Marcella Veronesi. Wed, 11 Mar 2020 12:00:00 +0100 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5035 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4926 Relatore: Michele Battisti; Provenienza: University of Palermo; Data inizio: 2020-03-25; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Tamara Fioroni. Wed, 25 Mar 2020 12:00:00 +0100 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4926 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4976 Relatore: Olivier Donni; Provenienza: Université de Cergy-Pontoise; Data inizio: 2020-04-22; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Martina Menon. Wed, 22 Apr 2020 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4976 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4990 Relatore: Owen O'Donnel; Provenienza: Erasmus School of Economics, Rotterdam; Data inizio: 2020-05-06; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Paolo Pertile. Wed, 6 May 2020 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4990 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4929 Relatore: Richard Van Weelden; Provenienza: University of Pittsburgh; Data inizio: 2020-05-13; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Emanuele Bracco. Wed, 13 May 2020 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4929 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4994 Relatore: Stein T. Holden; Provenienza: Norwegian University of Life Sciences; Data inizio: 2020-05-20; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Marcella Veronesi. Wed, 20 May 2020 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4994 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4930 Relatore: Massimiliano Onorato; Provenienza: University of Bologna; Data inizio: 2020-05-27; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Adelaide Baronchelli. Wed, 27 May 2020 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4930 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5057 Relatore: Francesco Cinnirella; Provenienza: Università di Bergamo; Data inizio: 2020-06-03; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Roberto Ricciuti. Wed, 3 Jun 2020 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5057 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5058 Relatore: Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary; Provenienza: Harvard University; Data inizio: 2020-06-09; Ora inizio: 10.00; Note orario: Polo Zanotto; Referente esterno: Enrico Maria Cazzaroli. Tue, 9 Jun 2020 10:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5058 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5045 Relatore: Tommaso Reggiani; Provenienza: Masaryk University; Data inizio: 2020-06-10; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Alessia Sconti. Wed, 10 Jun 2020 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5045 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5028 Relatore: Davide Marchiori; Provenienza: University of Southern Denmark; Data inizio: 2020-07-01; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Luca Zarri; Riassunto: We propose an experimental eye-tracking study of how strategic sophistication is shaped by experience in the contest of two-person normal-form games. Although strategic sophistication has been shown to be linked to a variety of endogenous and exogenous factors, little is known about how it is shaped by experience with previous interactive decisions. Whereas we show that payoff feedback in previous games can importantly influence strategic sophistication, we also show that games that provide theoretically equivalent learning opportunities can produce substantially different learning outcomes. Specifically, only feedback associated with repeated play of games that emphasize strategic interdependence (i.e., those in which the participants do not have a dominant strategy) enhances strategic learning, as demonstrated by the observed increased frequency of equilibrium play and the evolved way of collectingndash;and then processingndash;payoff information. Moreover, subgroups of individuals respond to experience in remarkably different ways. Whereas some players eventually learn to visually analyze the payoff matrix compatibly with an underlying equilibrium reasoning, others appear to use experience with previous interactions to devise simple heuristics of play. Our results have implications for theoretical and computational modeling in economics and Artificial Intelligence research. Wed, 1 Jul 2020 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=5028