Seminari - Dipartimento Economics Seminari - Dipartimento Economics validi dal 22.03.2019 al 22.03.2020. http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en Saraly Andrade de Sá (University of Geneva) on "Optimal biofuel promotion with land-use inertia" http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4687 Relatore: Saraly Andrade de Sá; Provenienza: University of Geneva; Data inizio: 2019-03-26; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, SMT.04; Referente interno: Luca Taschini; Riassunto: Pro-biofuel policies are to cause a large expansion of quot;semi-perennialquot;#39; energy crops (e.g., sugarcane, switchgrass, miscanthus) that exhibit long harvesting cycles (up to 20 years), unlike annual energy crops that need to be replanted every year (e.g., corn). This article shows that semi-perennials introduce inertia in land conversion to energy crops; although empirically observed, this inertia has never been taken into account in the design of pro-biofuel policies. The scientific debate over the net social benefits of biofuel production is progressing but still unsettled. Therefore, I characterize optimal energy crops land allocations in presence of scientific progress. In this context, inertia in land conversion to semi-perennial crops justifies biofuels to be allocated less land when energy crops are semi-perennial than when they are annual, even when identical returns are assumed. Tue, 26 Mar 2019 12:00:00 +0100 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4687 Domenico Rossignoli (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore) on "Clever little lies. Math performance and cheating in primary schools in Congo" (with M.A. Maggioni) http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4454 Relatore: Domenico Rossignoli; Provenienza: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Data inizio: 2019-03-27; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Alessandro Bucciol; Riassunto: This paper provides a novel contribution on the relation between school performance and cheating behavior by analyzing a sample of 170 pupils in 10 primary schools located in the outskirts of Goma (Congo, DR). In two subsequent school years, children were administered a questionnaire that included a modified Dice Rolling Task (DRT) and a Dictator Game (DG), while information on their school performance was obtained through the collection of school reports. We analyze whether cheating (measured through DRT) could be explained by school performance (measured by Math and Total scores) and altruism (measured by DG) when controlling for individual (such as age, sex, previously recorded cheating attitudes) and background (such as class, school, interviewer) characteristics. Our results show that cheating is positively associated with school performance, suggesting a positive correlation between cognitive abilities and the occurrence of opportunistic lies. This relation is robust to the inclusion of altruism as an explanatory variable. We also show that, while pupilsrsquo; cognitive skills are a good predictor of cheating, the opposite does not hold. Finally, we give evidence that math-skilled children tend to cheat more when the reward from cheating is larger. Wed, 27 Mar 2019 12:00:00 +0100 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4454 "Who pays for network infrastructure? The Cath-22 of decentralised energy technologies" http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4625 Relatore: Andrew Burlinson; Provenienza: University of Warwick; Data inizio: 2019-04-02; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Luigi Grossi; Riassunto: This paper explores the equity implications of the adoption of energy storage technology, potentially leading to defections from the electricity network. Our analysis of the social benefits and distributional effects of energy self-consumption shows that it can reduce the revenues of grid operators. Governments implementing policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions should also consider how to finance the investment in network infrastructure in the presence of self-generation and consumption. Tue, 2 Apr 2019 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4625 Julien Daubanes (University of Geneva) on "Green Finance and Climate Policy" (with J.-C. Rochet and T. Steffen) http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4686 Relatore: Julien Daubanes; Provenienza: University of Geneva; Data inizio: 2019-04-03; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Luca Taschini; Riassunto: A rapidly increasing amount of investment commits firms to undertake climate-friendly projects. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the development of green finance---and the associated certification process---makes a real difference: (1) firms that issue green bonds improve their environmental performance, in particular by reducing their CO2 emissions; (2) these bonds are issued at a (small) premium, attracting environmentally concerned investors; (3) surprisingly, the market value of firms that issue green bonds increases.Now more than ever, green finance is hoped to help governments meet their commitments to combat climate change. However, there exists no formal study that considers green finance as an alternative tool to address the climate problem.We present a model that consistently explains stylized facts. We examine firms that maximize their shareholder value by undertaking green and brown projects, and finance the former by issuing green bonds. Green projects emit less CO2 but entail abatement costs. Investors differ by their concern for environmental performance. Neither firms#39; fundamental profit nor abatement cost are perfectly observed by investors. Besides the environmental impact of green bonds, our theory suggests that green bonds allow firms to signal to investors their ability to efficiently reduce their CO2 emissions.We use our model to examine the optimal structure of climate policy. In the presence of climate finance, the optimal carbon tax is lower. If, for some reasons, the implementation of carbon taxation is limited, it becomes optimal to promote green finance accordingly. . Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4686 Luciano Campi (LSE) http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4540 Relatore: Luciano Campi; Provenienza: London School of Economics; Data inizio: 2019-04-24; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona (Room 1.59); Referente interno: Alessandro Gnoatto. Wed, 24 Apr 2019 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4540 Alessandro Iaria (university of Bristol) http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4619 Relatore: Alessandro Iaria; Provenienza: University of Bristol; Data inizio: 2019-05-08; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Luigi Grossi. Wed, 8 May 2019 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4619 Zsofia Barany (Sceince Po) http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4696 Relatore: Zsofia Barany; Provenienza: Sceince Po; Data inizio: 2019-05-15; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona (Room 1.59); Referente interno: Francesca Rossi. Wed, 15 May 2019 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4696 Auto elettrica http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4693 Relatore: Carlo De Pellegrini; Data inizio: 2019-05-23; Referente interno: Sergio Noto. Thu, 23 May 2019 00:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4693 Abhimanyu Gupta (University of Essex) http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4671 Relatore: Abhimanyu Gupta; Provenienza: University of Essex; Data inizio: 2019-06-05; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Francesca Rossi. Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4671 Nicola Pavanini (Tilburg University) http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4618 Relatore: Nicola Pavanini; Provenienza: Tilburg University; Data inizio: 2019-06-12; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Polo Santa Marta, Via Cantarane 24, Sala Vaona; Referente interno: Luigi Grossi. Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:00:00 +0200 http://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&rss=0&lang=en&id=4618