Seminari - Dipartimento Economics validi dal 12.10.2026 al 12.10.2027. https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7098 Relatore: Benoît Carré; Provenienza: The Danish Centre for Health Economics at the University of Southern Denmark; Data inizio: 2026-10-13; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Chiara Costi; Riassunto: How do private hospitals respond when a public health system changes demand for, and prices paid to, publicly funded private care? We study Denmark between 2008 and 2010 using administrative records for 42 elective procedures. We exploit two institutional shocks: a paramedical strike in public hospitals, and a temporary suspension of the patient-choice payment scheme. Private hospitals adjust mainly through activity. The probability of treating publicly funded patients rises during the strike and falls by ten percentage points after the suspension. Conditional on being active, private providers raise visit volumes by 66% during the strike and treat 1.42 additional conditions. During the same period, the activity of private hospitals is increasing, and this trend accelerates with the shocks. Case-mix changes are modest, and we find no response in 30-day emergency readmissions. Tue, 13 Oct 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7098 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7077 Relatore: Roberto Ricciuti; Provenienza: University of Verona; Data inizio: 2026-10-20; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona. Tue, 20 Oct 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7077 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7061 Relatore: Timothy Cason; Provenienza: Purdue University; Data inizio: 2026-10-22; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Luca Zarri; Riassunto: In organizations, experimentation with innovations is often decentralized across multiple units (e.g., functional areas, locations, subsidiaries, etc.). Because adopting innovations is risky, each unit may prefer to delay adoption and wait for information about the experience of others. Such delay could conflict with broader organizational learning because innovations may not be sufficiently tested early, slowing or even preventing adoption. Theoretically, in this dynamic social learning environment, the central planner (corporate manager) can reduce the benefit of information free-riding and help increase collective experimentation via binding and non-binding recommendations that discourage future innovation adoption. This paper uses lab experiments to investigate how human decision makers behave in these novel strategic interactions and their ability to resolve information free-riding. We find that subjects respond to the intervention mechanisms in the direction predicted by the theory; however, the magnitude of their response is insufficient to generate the expected benefits of the interventions. In addition, we find that subjects acting as the corporate manager who selects the information mechanism appear to anticipate the suboptimal adoption decisions of subordinates and frequently choose recommendation rules that do not discourage innovation adoption. . Thu, 22 Oct 2026 12:00:00 +0200 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7061 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7078 Relatore: Filippo Da Re; Provenienza: University of Padova; Data inizio: 2026-10-27; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Paola Bertoli. Tue, 27 Oct 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7078 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7059 Relatore: Tommaso Colussi; Provenienza: Università Cattolica di Milano; Data inizio: 2026-10-29; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Simone Quercia. Thu, 29 Oct 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7059 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7079 Relatore: Matteo Benedini; Provenienza: University of Verona; Data inizio: 2026-11-17; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona. Tue, 17 Nov 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7079 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7073 Relatore: Mario Macis; Provenienza: Johns Hopkins University; Data inizio: 2026-11-20; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Paola Bertoli. Fri, 20 Nov 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7073 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7080 Relatore: Clementina Crocè; Provenienza: University of Padova; Data inizio: 2026-11-24; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Giulia Montresor. Tue, 24 Nov 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7080 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7057 Relatore: Joanna Kopinska; Provenienza: Sapienza Università di Roma; Data inizio: 2026-11-26; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Giulia Montresor. Thu, 26 Nov 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7057 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7081 Relatore: Matilde Cappelletti; Provenienza: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management; Data inizio: 2026-12-01; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula VaonaMatilde Cappelletti; Referente interno: Giovanni Righetti. Tue, 1 Dec 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7081 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7058 Relatore: Leopoldo Catania; Provenienza: Aarhus University; Data inizio: 2026-12-03; Ora inizio: 12.00; Note orario: Aula Vaona; Referente interno: Alessandro Bucciol. Thu, 3 Dec 2026 12:00:00 +0100 https://www.dse.univr.it/?ent=seminario&lang=en&rss=0&id=7058